We design the first truthful-in-expectation, constant-factor approximation mechanisms for NP-hard cases of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with nonidentical items and in combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are nonnegative linear combinations of gross-substitute valuations, a class that encompasses many of the most well-studied subclasses of submodular functions, including coverage functions and weighted matroid rank functions. Our mechanisms have an expected polynomial runtime and achieve an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e. This approximation factor is the best possible for both problems, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P = NP. Recent impossibility results suggest that our results cannot be extended to a significantly larger valuation class.
INTRODUCTION

Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects
The overarching goal of algorithmic mechanism design is to design computationally efficient algorithms that solve or approximate fundamental optimization problems in which the underlying data is a priori unknown to the algorithm. The first problem that we study, which is central in both theory and practice, is welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions (CAs) . In a CA, there are m items for sale and n bidders vying for them. Each bidder i has a private valuation v i (S) for each subset S of the items. 1 The welfare of an allocation S 1 , . . . , S n of the items to the bidders is n i=1 v i (S i ). The second problem is welfare maximization in combinatorial public projects (CPPs) . Here, a public planner chooses a subset of m projects. Each player i has a private valuation v i (S) for each subset S of projects. The welfare maximization problem is to compute a subset of at most k projects that maximizes n i=1 v i (S). 2 We consider both problems with valuations that are initially unknown to the decisionmaker; thus, computing a near-optimal allocation requires eliciting information from the (self-interested) players, for example, via a bid. A mechanism is a protocol that extracts such information and computes an allocation of the items or projects. We additionally allow mechanisms to charge payments to players in order to incentivize the truthful reporting of valuations. We call a (possibly randomized) mechanism "incentivecompatible" or "truthful" if every participant maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully revealing its information to the mechanism, no matter how the other participants behave (see Section 2.2 for formal definitions). A simple example of a truthful mechanism is the second-price single-item auction, which sells a good to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second-highest bid.
We seek mechanisms that run in time polynomial in n and m. If we drop the computational efficiency requirement; then, we can solve exactly the two welfare maximization problems just mentioned using the incentive-compatible VCG mechanism (see, e.g., ). They cannot be solved efficiently, however, except for highly restricted classes of valuations. These problems are also highly inapproximable for general valuations-even by nontruthful computationally efficient algorithms-thus, it is most interesting to study them for restricted classes of valuations that at least admit good approximation algorithms.
The "holy grail" of algorithmic mechanism design is to design polynomial-time truthful approximation mechanisms that match the approximation guarantee of the best (nontruthful) polynomial-time approximation algorithms. Unfortunately, several recent impossibility results have shed serious doubt on the possibility of this goal in general [Dobzinski and Nisan 2007; Papadimitriou et al. 2008; Buchfuhrer et al. 2010a Buchfuhrer et al. , 2010b Dobzinski 2011; Dughmi and Vondrák 2011; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012] . 3 This article provides such positive results for welfare maximization in CAs and CPPs for a fundamental class of valuations, via a novel randomized mechanism design framework based on convex optimization. 
The Challenge of Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Algorithmic mechanism design is difficult because incentive compatibility severely limits how an algorithm can compute an outcome. This prohibits use of most of the ingenious approximation algorithms that have been developed for different optimization problems. The incentive-compatibility constraint necessitates the design of carefully crafted approximation algorithms tailored specifically for truthfulness. Understanding the power of these truthful approximation mechanisms is the central goal of algorithmic mechanism design. This research agenda was first advocated by Nisan and Ronen [2001] . Since then, CAs and CPPs have emerged as the paradigmatic "challenge problems" of the field, with much work in recent years establishing upper and lower bounds on truthful polynomial-time mechanisms for these problems (e.g., Lavi and Swamy [2005] , Dobzinski et al. [2005] , , , Dobzinski and Nisan [2007] , Dobzinski [2007] , Dobzinski and Sundararajan [2008] , Papadimitriou et al. [2008] , Buchfuhrer et al. [2010a Buchfuhrer et al. [ , 2010b , Dobzinski [2011] , Dughmi et al. [2011a] , , Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] , and Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] ).
The most general approach known for designing (randomized) truthful mechanisms is via maximal-in-distributional range (MIDR) algorithms [Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009; Dughmi and Roughgarden 2010 ]. An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions-the distributional range-independent of the valuations reported by the self-interested participants, and outputs a random sample from the distribution that maximizes expected (reported) welfare. An analog of the payments of the VCG mechanism can be used to extend an MIDR algorithm to a truthful (in expectation) mechanism.
Most approximation algorithms are not MIDR algorithms. Consider, as an example, a randomized rounding algorithm for welfare maximization in CAs (e.g., and ). We can view such an algorithm as the composition of two algorithms, a relaxation algorithm and a rounding algorithm (see Figure 1(a) ). The relaxation algorithm is deterministic and takes as input the problem data (players ' valuations v) , and outputs the (fractional) solution to a linear programming relaxation of the welfare-maximization problem that is optimal for the objective function defined by v. The rounding algorithm is randomized and takes as input this 30:4 S. Dughmi et al. fractional solution, and outputs a feasible allocation of the items to the players. Taken together, these algorithms assign to each input v a probability distribution D(v) over integral allocations. For almost all known randomized rounding algorithms, there is an input v such that the expected objective function value E y∼D (v) [v T y] with the distribution D(v) is inferior to that E y∼D (w) [v T y] with a distribution D(w) that the algorithm would produce for a different input w-which is a violation of the MIDR property. Informally, such violations are inevitable unless a rounding algorithm is designed explicitly to avoid them on top of the usual approximation requirements.
The exception that proves the rule is the important and well-known mechanism design framework of Lavi and Swamy [2005] , who begin with the foothold that the fractional welfare maximization problem-the relaxation algorithm delineated earliercan be made truthful by charging appropriate VCG payments. Further, they identify a very special type of rounding algorithm that preserves truthfulness: if the expected allocation produced by the rounding algorithm is always identical to the input to the rounding algorithm, component-wise, up to some universal scaling factor α, then composing the two algorithms easily yields an α-approximate truthful-in-expectation mechanism (after scaling the fractional VCG payments by α). Perhaps surprisingly, there are some interesting problems, such as welfare maximization in CAs with general valuations, that admit such a rounding algorithm with a best-possible approximation guarantee (assuming P = NP). However, most NP-hard welfare maximization problems, including CAs and CPPs with restricted valuation classes, do not seem to admit good randomized rounding algorithms of the rigid type required by this design framework.
Our Contributions
We introduce a new approach to designing truthful-in-expectation approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms; we outline it here for the special case of welfare maximization in CAs. The high-level idea is to optimize directly on the outcome of the rounding algorithm, rather than merely on the outcome of the relaxation algorithm (the input to the rounding algorithm). See also Figure 1(b) . In other words, let r(x) denote a randomized rounding algorithm, from fractional allocations to integer allocations. Given players' valuations v, we compute a fractional allocation x that maximizes the expected welfare E y∼r (x) [v T y] over all fractional allocations x. This methodology evidently gives MIDR algorithms. This optimization problem is often intractable, but when the rounding algorithm r and the space of valuations v are such that the function E y∼r (x) [v T y] is always concave in x-in which case, we call r a convex rounding algorithm-it can be solved in polynomial time using convex programming (modulo numerical issues that we address later).
For our first main result, we use this design framework to give an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in CAs in which every bidder's valuation belongs to a rich subclass of submodular valuations. 4 This subclass consists of all nonnegative linear combinations of gross-substitute (GS) valuations, which we denote by CGS (C standing for "cone"); see Section 2.5 for formal definitions. In addition to all GS valuations, this set encompasses many of the concrete examples of submodular functions that have been studied in the CA literature, including coverage functions and matroid-weighted rank functions (see Appendix A.1 for formal definitions). Our mechanism treats valuations as "black boxes," and assumes that they support only a randomized analog of a "value oracle." We also give an explicit (nonoracle-based) implementation of the mechanism for explicitly represented coverage valuations.
Our approximation guarantee is optimal, assuming that P = NP, even for the welfare maximization problem with known and explicitly presented coverage valuations [Khot et al. 2008] . Our mechanism is the first truthful-in-expectation and (expected) polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard class of CAs without assuming that there is a logarithmic (in m) number of copies of every type of item. Recent negative results for truthful approximation mechanisms for CAs with bidders with general submodular valuations [Dughmi and Vondrák 2011; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012] suggest that our positive results cannot be extended to a significantly larger valuation class.
Our second result is a (1 − 1/e)-approximate truthful-in-expectation mechanism for welfare maximization for CPPs with CGS valuations that runs in expected polynomialtime. This is the best approximation possible for this problem, even with only GS valuations and without truthfulness, unless P = NP. Therefore, ours is the first truthful mechanism for an NP-hard variant of CPP that matches the approximation ratio of the best nontruthful algorithm. Again, recent impossibility results [Dughmi and Vondrák 2011; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012] suggest that this guarantee cannot be extended to significantly more general valuations.
Both of our mechanisms are instantiations of our convex rounding framework. For CAs, we use a randomized rounding algorithm that allocates each item independently. We show that standard randomized rounding does not yield a convex rounding algorithm, but composing it with a suitable transformation of the optimal fractional solution does (for CGS valuations). We also show that at least a (1 − 1/e) fraction of the expected welfare of a fractional solution is preserved by this transformation.
For CPPs, to respect the cardinality constraint of k on the set of chosen projects, our rounding scheme cannot round different items independently. While the expected value of a submodular function over a product distribution (i.e., with independent rounding) has been studied extensively, and is closely related to the now well-understood multilinear extension (see, e.g., Calinescu et al. [2007] and Vondrák [2008] ), proving the necessary convexity and approximation results for our dependent distribution requires new ideas. We address this technical challenge by combining ideas from combinatorics and convex analysis.
We next mention a few caveats. First, our solution concept is truthfulness in expectation, meaning that each player maximizes its expected payoff by reporting its valuation truthfully; the expectation is over the internal random coins of our mechanisms. This contrasts with universal truthfulness, in which truthful reporting maximizes a player's payoff for every draw of the mechanism's coins. 5 Second, the runtime of our mechanisms is polynomial in expectation, rather than polynomial in the worst case. The reasons are that convex programs typically cannot be solved exactly in finite time, but rather can be solved to arbitrary precision, and that truthfulness in expectation requires exactly sampling a lottery with probabilities determined by the variables of the convex program. We work around this technical difficulty by solving the convex program to the precision necessary for sampling the outcome of the mechanism, leading to polynomial runtime in expectation. The details are in Appendix C. Third, our mechanisms assume access to oracles that are somewhat more powerful than the traditional value oracles typically used in set-function optimization. While our oracles are #P-hard to evaluate for some representations of some set functions, we show how to implement them efficiently for some natural classes of succinctly described set functions. Also, such oracles can always be simulated to arbitrary precision using value oracles and random sampling. The latter approach leads to approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. We discuss this issue further in Appendix B.1.
Additional Discussion of Related Work
1.4.1. Combinatorial Auctions. For CAs, we discuss only the results most pertinent to this work; see Cramton et al. [2006] for an introduction to the topic and [Blumrosen and Nisan 2007] for a survey of truthful approximation mechanisms for CAs.
For the welfare maximization problem in CAs with general valuations (assuming only that v i (∅) = 0 and that v i (S) ≤ v i (T ) whenever S ⊆ T ), the best approximation factor possible by a polynomial-time approximation algorithm is roughly min{ √ m, n}, where n is the number of bidders and m is the number of items. There are comparable unconditional lower bounds for polynomial communication and unbounded computation [Mirrokni et al. 2008 ] and hardness of approximation results for various classes of succinctly represented valuations [Lehmann et al. 2002] .
These strong negative results for welfare maximization with general valuations motivate the study of important special cases. Numerous special cases have been considered (see Blumrosen and Nisan [2007, Fig. 1 .2]), and the most well-studied one is for bidders with submodular valuations. Without incentive-compatibility constraints, the welfare maximization problem with submodular bidder valuations is completely solved. Vondrák [2008] gave a (1− 1 e )-approximation algorithm for the problem, improving over the 1 2 -approximation given in Lehmann et al. [2006] . The algorithm in Vondrák [2008] works in the value oracle model, where each valuation v is modeled as a "black box" that returns the value v(S) of a queried set S in a single operation. The approximation factor of 1 − 1 e is unconditionally optimal in the value-oracle model (for polynomial communication) [Mirrokni et al. 2008] , and is also optimal (for polynomial time) for certain succinctly represented submodular valuations, assuming that P = NP [Khot et al. 2008] . The result of Khot et al. [2008] implies that 1 − 1/e is the optimal approximation factor in our model as well, assuming that P = NP.
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Despite intense study, prior to this work, there were no truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time constant-factor approximation mechanisms for welfare maximization in CAs with any nontrivial subclass of submodular bidder valuations. The best previous results, which apply to all submodular valuations, are a truthful-inexpectation O( log m log log m ) approximation mechanism in the communication complexity model by Dobzinski et al. [2010] , and a universally truthful 7 O(log mlog log m) approximation mechanism in the demand oracle model by Dobzinski [2007] .
The aforementioned works [Dobzinski et al. 2010; Lavi and Swamy 2005] are precursors to our general design framework that optimizes directly over the output of a randomized rounding algorithm. In the framework of Lavi and Swamy [2005] , the input to and output of the rounding algorithm are assumed to coincide up to a scaling factor; thus, optimizing over its input (as they do) is equivalent to optimizing over its output (as we do). In the result of Dobzinski et al. [2010] , optimizing with respect to their "proxy bidders" is equivalent to optimizing over the output of a particular randomized rounding algorithm. 6 We show in Appendix B.1 that our oracle model is no more powerful than polynomial-time computation in the special case of explicitly represented coverage functions, for which 1 − 1/e is optimal assuming that P = NP [Khot et al. 2008] . In contrast, the work of Feige and Vondrák [2006] improves on the approximation factor of 1 − 1/e by using demand oracles, which, for coverage functions, can encode the NP-hard Set Cover problem. 7 A mechanism is universally-truthful if, for every realization of the mechanism's coins, each player maximizes his payoff by bidding truthfully. Universally truthful mechanisms are defined formally in Section 2.2.
1.4.2. Combinatorial Public Projects. CPPs, in particular their exact variant, were first introduced by Papadimitriou et al. [2008] . They show that no deterministic truthful mechanism for exact CPPs with submodular valuations can guarantee better than a O( √ m) approximation to the optimal social welfare. The nonstrategic version of the problem, on the other hand, is equivalent to maximizing a submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint, and admits a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm [Nemhauser et al. 1978] . This is optimal, assuming that P = NP [Raz and Safra 1997] . Buchfuhrer et al. [2010b] explored approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for CPPs with various classes of valuations in the submodular hierarchy. The most relevant result of Buchfuhrer et al. [2010b] to our article is a lower bound of O( √ m) on deterministic truthful mechanisms for the exact variant of CPPs with coverage valuations-a class of valuations for which our randomized mechanism for flexible CPPs obtains a (1 − 1/e) approximation. Dobzinski [2011] showed two lower bounds for CPPs in the value oracle model: a lower bound of O( √ m) on universally truthful mechanisms for flexible CPPs with submodular valuations, and a lower bound of O( √ m) on truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact CPPs with submodular valuations.
1.4.3. More Recent Work. Since the initial publication of the work in the article, impossibility results in Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] and Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] have ruled out polynomial-time constant-approximation truthful mechanisms for CAs and public projects with general submodular valuations. The results of Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] hold in the value-oracle model, and those of Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] hold in the computational complexity model assuming that NP ⊆ P/ poly. Moreover, the convex rounding framework has been employed in Hoefer and Kesselheim [2012] to design truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks.
PRELIMINARIES
Optimization Problems
We consider optimization problems of the following general form. Each instance of consists of a feasible set S, and an objective function w : S → R. The solution to an instance of is given by the following optimization problem. maximize w(x) subject to x ∈ S.
(1)
Mechanism Design Basics
We consider mechanism design optimization problems of the form in Equation (1). In such problems, there are n players, in which each player i has a valuation function v i : S → R. We are concerned with welfare maximization problems, for which the objective is w(
. We consider direct-revelation mechanisms for optimization mechanism design problems. Such a mechanism comprises an allocation rule, which is a function from (hopefully truthfully) reported valuation functions v 1 , . . . , v n to an outcome x ∈ S, and a payment rule, which is a function from reported valuation functions to a required payment from each player. We allow the allocation and payment rules to be randomized.
A mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is truthful in expectation if every player always maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully reporting its valuation function, meaning that
for every player i, (true) valuation function v i , (reported) valuation function v i , and (reported) valuation functions v −i of the other players. The expectation in Equation (2) is over the coin flips of the mechanism. If Equation (2) holds for every flip of the coin, rather than merely in expectation, we call the mechanism universally truthful. The mechanisms that we design can be thought of as randomized variations on the classical VCG mechanism, as we explain next. Recall that the VCG mechanism is defined by the (generally intractable) allocation rule that selects the welfare-maximizing outcome with respect to the reported valuation functions, and the payment rule that charges each player i a bid-independent "pivot term" minus the reported welfare earned by other players in the selected outcome. This (deterministic) mechanism is truthful (see, e.g., Nisan [2007] ). Now, let dist(S) denote the probability distributions over a feasible set S, and let D ⊆ dist(S) be a compact subset of them. The corresponding MIDR allocation rule is defined as follows: given reported valuation functions v 1 , . . . , v n , return an outcome that is sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ D that maximizes the expected welfare
Analogous to the VCG mechanism, there is a (randomized) payment rule that can be coupled with this allocation rule to yield a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see Dobzinski and Dughmi [2009] ).
Combinatorial Auctions
In CAs, there is a set [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m} of items, and a set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
Each player i has a valuation function
, where S i denotes the items assigned to player i, and {S i } i are mutually disjoint subsets of [m] . Player i's value for outcome (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is equal to v i (S i ). The goal is to choose the allocation maximizing social welfare: i v i (S i ).
Combinatorial Public Projects
In CPPs, there is a set [m] = {1, . . . , m} of projects, a cardinality bound k such that 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of players. Each player i has a valuation function
. In this article, we consider the flexible variant of CPPs: a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] of projects with |S| ≤ k. Player i's value for outcome S is equal to v i (S). The goal is to choose the feasible set S maximizing social welfare: i v i (S).
Gross Substitutes and CGS Valuations
We now define the valuation class to which our results apply. We begin with the fundamental class of GS valuations. For a valuation v : 2
[m] → R + and a price vector
} of utilitymaximizing bundles at the prices p. The usual definition of GS valuations states that increasing the price of some goods can only increase the demand for other goods.
Definition 2.1 (Kelso, Jr. and Crawford [1982] 
The following price-free characterization of GS valuations is more convenient for our purposes. It follows from combining results in Lehmann et al. [2006] and Bing et al. [2004] ; see also the survey by Paes Leme [2013] .
is the deficit in additivity of i and j given the set S:
It was shown in Gul and Stacchetti [1999] that GS valuations are submodular. One interesting subclass of GS valuations is the set of matroid-weighted rank functions (see Appendix A.1 for a review of relevant concepts from matroid theory). Welfare-maximization in CAs with GS bidder valuations can be solved in polynomial time [Murota 1996] .
GS valuations are not closed under addition; in fact, even the sum of matroid rank functions may not be in GS-see Paes Leme [2013] for an example. We therefore obtain a more general valuation class by considering all nonnegative linear combinations of GS valuations-the cone generated by GS valuations (CGS).
Since submodular valuations are closed under nonnegative linear combinations, CGS valuations are submodular. CGS valuations include most concrete examples of monotone submodular valuations that appear in the literature, including coverage functions. 8 Moreover, if P = NP and without regard to incentive compatibility, 1 − 1/e is the best approximation possible in polynomial time for CAs [Khot et al. 2008 ] when players have CGS valuations and for CPPs [Raz and Safra 1997] even when players have GS valuations.
9 That said, we note that some interesting submodular functions-such as some budget additive functions 10 -are not in the CGS family (see Appendix B.3).
Lotteries and Oracles
A value oracle for a valuation v :
, and returns v(S). We define two analogous oracles, one for use in our mechanism for CAs and the other for CPPs, that each take as input a description of a simple lottery over subsets of [m] , and output the expectation of v over this lottery. While our "lottery oracles" cannot be implemented efficiently for all explicitly represented CGS functions, they nevertheless can be approximated arbitrarily well with high probability using random sampling, and can efficiently be implemented exactly for explicitly represented coverage valuations. We discuss the details in Appendix B.1. 2.6.1. Product-Lottery-Value Oracles. First, we define product-lottery-value oracles, which we will use in our mechanism for CAs. Given a vector x ∈ [0, 1] m of probabilities on the items, let D x be the distribution over S ⊆ [m] that includes each item j in S independently with probability x j . We use F v (x) to denote the expected value of v(S) over draws S ∼ D x from this lottery. 
We note that F v is simply the well-studied multilinear extension of v (see, e.g., Calinescu et al. [2007] and Vondrák [2008] 
THE CONVEX ROUNDING FRAMEWORK
Relaxations and Rounding Schemes
Let be an optimization problem. A relaxation of defines for every (S, w) ∈ a convex and compact relaxed feasible set R ⊆ R m that is independent of w (we suppress the dependence on S) and an extension w R : R → R of the objective w to the relaxed feasible set R.
11 This gives the following relaxed optimization problem:
Generally, the extension is defined so that it is computationally tractable to find a point x ∈ R that maximizes w R (x) (possibly approximately). For example, S could be the allocations of m items to n bidders in a CA, w(x) the welfare of an allocation, R the feasible region of a linear programming relaxation, and w R the natural linear extension of w to fractional allocations.
The solution x ∈ R to the relaxed problem need not be in S. A rounding scheme for relaxation of defines for each feasible set S of , and its corresponding relaxed set R, a (possibly randomized) function r : R → S. Since our rounding scheme will be randomized, we will frequently use r(x) to denote the distribution over S resulting from rounding the point x ∈ R. Commonly, the rounding scheme satisfies the following approximation guarantee:
In this case, if x * maximizes w R over R and w R agrees with w on S, then E y∼r(x * ) [w(y)] ≥ α · max y∈S w(y).
Convex Rounding Schemes and MIDR
Our technique is motivated by the following observation: instead of solving the relaxed problem and subsequently rounding the solution, why not optimize directly on the outcome of the rounding scheme? In particular, consider the following relaxation of that "absorbs" rounding scheme r into the objective:
The solution to this problem rounds to the best possible distribution in the range of the rounding scheme, over all possible fractional solutions in R. While this problem is often intractable, it always leads to an MIDR allocation rule.
ALGORITHM 1: MIDR Allocation Rule via Optimizing over Output of Rounding Scheme
Parameter: Feasible set S of .
LEMMA 3.1. Algorithm 1 is an MIDR allocation rule.
We say that a rounding scheme r :
When r is α-approximate, so is the allocation rule of Algorithm 1.
LEMMA 3.2. If r is an α-approximate rounding scheme, then Algorithm 1 returns an α-approximate solution (in expectation) to the original optimization problem (Equation (1)).
For most rounding schemes in the approximation-algorithm literature, the optimization problem (Equation (6)) cannot be solved in polynomial time (assuming that P = NP). The reason is that for any rounding scheme that always rounds a feasible solution to itself-that is, r(x) = x for all x ∈ S-an optimal solution to Equation (6) is also optimal for Equation (1). Thus, in this case, hardness of the original problem Equation (1) implies hardness of Equation (6). We conclude that we need to design rounding schemes with the unusual property that r(x) = x for some x ∈ S.
We call a (randomized) rounding scheme r :
] is a concave function of x ∈ R. Convex rounding schemes induce convex optimization problems. LEMMA 3.3. When r is a convex rounding scheme, Equation (6) is a convex optimization problem.
Under additional technical conditions, discussed in the context of CAs in Appendix C.1, and in the context of CPPs in Appendix C.2, the convex program Equation (6) can be solved efficiently (e.g., using the ellipsoid method). This reduces the design of a polynomial-time α-approximate MIDR algorithm to designing a polynomialtime α-approximate convex rounding scheme.
Summarizing, Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 give the following informal theorem. Of course, there is no reason a priori to believe that useful convex rounding schemeslet alone ones computable in polynomial time-exist for any important problems. We show in Sections 4 and 5 that they do, in fact, exist for CAs and CPPs with CGS valuations.
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
In this section, we use the framework of Section 3 to prove our result for CAs. We formulate welfare maximization in CAs as an optimization problem as follows. An instance (S, w) of CAs is given by the following integer program with feasible set S contained in {0, 1} n×m . Variable x ij indicates whether item j is allocated to player i, and w(x) denotes the social welfare of allocation x.
We let the relaxed feasible set R = R(S) be the result of relaxing the constraints x ij ∈ {0, 1} of (7) to 0 ≤ x ij ≤ 1. We structure the proof of Theorem 4.1 as follows. We define the Poisson rounding scheme, which we denote by r poiss , in Section 4.1. We prove that r poiss is (1 − 1/e)-approximate (Lemma 4.3), and convex (Lemma 4.2). Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 4.3, taken together, imply that Algorithm 1, when instantiated for CAs with r = r poiss , is a (1−1/e)-approximate MIDR allocation rule. Lemma 4.2 reduces implementing this allocation rule to solving a convex program.
In Appendix C, we handle the technical and numerical issues related to solving convex programs. First, we prove that our instantiation of Algorithm 1 for CAs can be implemented in expected polynomial time using the ellipsoid method under a simplifying assumption on the numerical conditioning of our convex program (Lemma C.2). Then, we show in Section C.1.3 that the previous assumption can be removed by slightly modifying our rounding scheme.
Finally, Proposition B.3 in Appendix B.2 shows that truth-telling VCG payments for our mechanism can be computed efficiently. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The Poisson Rounding Scheme
In this section, we define the Poisson rounding scheme, which we denote by r poiss . When instantiated for CAs with r = r poiss , Algorithm 1 reduces to solving the following optimization problem:
We define the Poisson rounding scheme as follows. Given a fractional solution x to Equation (8), do the following independently for each item j: assign j to player i with probability 1 − e −x ij . (This is well defined since 1 − e −x ij ≤ x ij for all players i and items j, and i x ij ≤ 1 for all items j.) We make this more precise in Algorithm 2. For clarity, we represent an allocation as a function from items to players, with an additional null player * reserved for items that are left unassigned. The Poisson rounding scheme is (1− 1/e)-approximate and convex. The proof of the approximation guarantee (Lemma 4.3) is not difficult, and is included here. We prove convexity (Lemma 4.2) in Section 4.3. As a warm-up, we first present a simplified proof of convexity for the special case of coverage valuations in Section 4.2. Draw p j uniformly at random from [0, 1].
3:
Let a( j) be the minimum index such that i≤a( j) (1 − e −x ij ) ≥ p j . PROOF. Let S 1 , . . . , S n be an allocation, and let x be the integer point of Equation (8) corresponding to S 1 , . . . , S n . Let (S 1 , . . . , S n ) ∼ r poiss (x). It suffices to show that
By definition of the Poisson rounding scheme, S i includes each j ∈ S i with probability 1−1/e. Submodularity implies that E[v i (S i )] ≥ (1−1/e)·v i (S i ). This has been previously shown in many contexts: see, for example, Feige et al. [2007, Lemma 2.2] , and the earlier related result in Feige [2006, Proposition 2.3] . Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we provide a proof here.
Let v : 2 [m] → R + be a monotone and submodular set function, S ⊆ [m] be a fixed set, α ≥ 0 be a constant, and T ⊆ [m] be a random variable with the property that Pr[i ∈ T ] ≥ α for every i ∈ S. We will show that E[v(T )] ≥ αv(S). We use the fact that every submodular set function is in the class XOS; that is, it can be expressed as the pointwise maximum of a finite number of modular functions [Lehmann et al. 2006] . Specifically, there exists a positive integer k and nonnegative weights {w ij :
. We now use Jensen's inequality and the relationship between S and the random variable T to complete the proof:
Warm-Up: Convexity for Coverage Valuations
In this section, we prove the special case of Lemma 4.2 for coverage valuations, as defined in Section 2.5. Fix n, m, and coverage valuations
, and let R denote the feasible set of mathematical program Equation (8). Let (S 1 , . . . , S n ) ∼ r poiss (x) be the (random) allocation computed by the Poisson rounding scheme for point x ∈ R. The expected welfare E[w(r poiss (x))] can be written as E[
, where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the rounding scheme. By linearity of expectation, as well as the fact that the sum of concave functions is concave, it suffices to show that E[v i (S i )] is a concave function of x for an arbitrary player i with coverage valuation v i .
Fix player i, and use x j , v, and S as shorthand for x ij , v i , and S i , respectively. Recall that v is a coverage function; let L be a ground set and
. The Poisson rounding scheme includes each item j in S independently with probability 1 − e −x j . The expected value of player i can be written as follows:
Since the sum of concave functions is concave, it suffices to show that Pr[ ∈ ∪ j∈S A j ] is concave in x for each ∈ L. We can interpret Pr[ ∈ ∪ j∈S A j ] as the probability that element is covered by an item in S, where j ∈ [m] covers ∈ L if ∈ A j . For each ∈ L, let C be the set of items that cover . Element ∈ L is covered by S precisely when C ∩ S = ∅. Each item j ∈ C is included in S independently with probability 1 − e −x j . Therefore, the probability that ∈ L is covered by S can be rewritten as follows:
Equation (9) is the composition of the concave function g(y) = 1 − e −y with the affine function y → j∈C x j . It is well known that composing a concave function with an affine function yields another concave function (see, e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004] ). Therefore, Pr[ ∈ ∪ j∈S A j ] is concave in x for each ∈ L, as needed. This completes the proof.
Convexity for CGS Valuations
In this section, we will prove Lemma 4.2 in its full generality. First, we define a discrete analogue of a Hessian matrix for set functions, and show that these discrete Hessians are negative semidefinite for CGS functions. 
is the deficit in additivity of j and k given the set S, as defined in Equation (3).
PROOF. We observe that H
v S is linear in v, and recall that a nonnegative weighted sum of negative semidefinite matrices is negative semidefinite. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove this claim when v is a GS function.
We assume that v is in GS, and let F v S ∈ R m×m be as defined in Equation (3). Since Let a 1 , . . . , a τ be the (distinct) real numbers appearing in F, and assume that a 1 < a 2 < . . . < a τ . We write F as a nonnegative weighted sum of {0, 1} matrices as follows: m×m is a binary matrix encoding a symmetric and transitive relation on m elements, then A = PBP T where P ∈ {0, 1} m×m is a permutation matrix and B ∈ {0, 1} m×m is block diagonal. It is easy to show (and well known) that a block-diagonal binary matrix is positive semidefinite, and that orthogonal similarity preserves positive semidefiniteness. We conclude that F v S is a nonnegative-weighted sum of positive semidefinite matrices, thus is positive semidefinite. Consequently, H v S is negative semidefinite. We now return to Lemma 4.2. Fix n, m, and CGS valuations {v i } n i=1 , and let R denote the feasible set of mathematical program Equation (8). Let (S 1 , . . . , S n ) ∼ r poiss (x) be the (random) allocation computed by the Poisson rounding scheme for point x ∈ R. The expected welfare E[w(r poiss (x))] can be written as E[
, where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the rounding scheme. By linearity of expectation, as well as the fact that the sum of concave functions is concave, it suffices to show that E[v i (S i )] is a concave function of x for an arbitrary player i with CGS valuation v i .
Fix player i, and use x j , v, S as shorthand for x ij , v i , S i , respectively. The Poisson rounding scheme includes each item j in S independently with probability 1 − e −x j . We can now write the expected value of player i as the following function G v : R m → R:
The following claim, combined with Claim 4.5, completes the proof of Lemma 4.2. . We work with G v as expressed in Equation (11). We will show that the Hessian matrix of G v at an arbitrary x ∈ R m is negative semidefinite, which is a sufficient condition for concavity. First, we fix j and k (possibly with j = k) and take the second-order partial derivative of G v with respect to x j and x k :
The first equality follows easily from elementary rules of differentiation. The second equality follows by grouping sets S ⊆ [m] according to their projection T onto [m]\{ j, k}. The third equality follows from the fact that v(T )−v(T ∪{ j})−v(T ∪{k})+v(T ∪{ j, k}) = 0 when T includes either of j and k. The last equality follows by definition of H v
T . This derivation immediately implies that we can write the Hessian matrix of G v (x) as a nonnegative weighted sum of discrete Hessian matrices:
A non-negative weighted sum of negative semi-definite matrices is negative semidefinite. This completes the proof of the claim.
COMBINATORIAL PUBLIC PROJECTS
In this section, we prove our result for CPPs.
THEOREM 5.1. There is a (1 − 1/e)-approximate, truthful-in-expectation mechanism for CPPs with CGS valuations in the bounded-lottery-value oracle model, running in expected poly(n, m) time.
We formulate welfare maximization in CPPs as an optimization problem as follows. An instance (S, w) is given by the following integer program with feasible set S contained in {0, 1} m . Variable x j indicates whether project j is selected, and w(x) denotes the social welfare of allocation x.
We let the relaxed feasible set R = R(S) be the result of relaxing the constraints x j ∈ {0, 1} of (7) to 0 ≤ x j ≤ 1. We structure the proof of Theorem 5.1 similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.1. We define the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme, which we denote by r k , in Section 5.1. We prove that r k is (1−1/e)-approximate (Lemma 5.3), and convex (Lemma 5.2). Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 5.3, taken together, imply that Algorithm 1, when instantiated for CPPs with r = r k , is a (1 − 1/e)-approximate MIDR allocation rule. Lemma 5.2 reduces implementing this allocation rule to solving a convex program.
The rest of the proof of Theorem 5.1 proceeds as for Theorem 4.1. Specifically, we handle technical and numerical issues related to solving convex programs in Appendix C, and Proposition B.3 shows that truth-telling VCG payments can be computed efficiently.
The k-Bounded-Lottery Rounding Scheme
We now define the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme for CPPs, which we denote by r k . When instantiated for CPPs with r = r k , Algorithm 1 reduces to solving the following optimization problem:
Given a feasible solution x for mathematical program Equation (14), we let distribution r k (x) be the k-bounded lottery with marginals x/k, as defined in Section 2.6. We make this more explicit in Algorithm 3. The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme is (1 − 1/e) approximate and convex. We prove the approximation lemma here, and convexity in Section 5.2. 
PROOF. Fix n, m, k and {v
. Let S ⊆ [m] be a feasible solution to CPPs-that is, |S| ≤ k. Let 1 S be the vector with 1 in indices corresponding to S, and 0 otherwise. Let T ∼ r k (1 S ). We will first show that each element of j ∈ S is included in T with probability at least 1 − 1/e. Observe that T is the union of k independent draws from a distribution on [m] ∪ { * }, where each time the probability of j ∈ S is 1/k. Therefore, the probability that j is included in T is 1 − (1 − 1/k) k ≥ 1 − 1/e. As in the proof of Lemma 4.3, submodularity implies that E[v i (T )] ≥ (1 − 1/e) · v i (S) for each player i. This completes the proof.
Convexity for CGS Valuations
In this section, we will prove Lemma 5.2. We note that the special case of Lemma 5.2 for coverage valuations admits a simpler proof similar to that in Section 4.2, with the the function 1 − (1 − [m] → R, the following function of x ∈ P k is concave in x:
We use techniques from combinatorics to write Pr[r k (x) = S] in a form that will be easier to work with. 
PROOF. First, we observe that Pr[r k (x) ⊆ R] can be expressed as a simple closed form in x for every set R ⊆ [m]. Let p 1 , . . . , p k and I 1 , . . . , I m be as in Algorithm 3. The event r k (x) ⊆ R occurs exactly when none of p 1 , . . . , p k land in the intervals corresponding to projects R. Recalling that the interval I j of project j has length x j /k, we get that the probability of any particular p t falling in ∪ j∈R I j is exactly x R /k. Therefore, by the independence of the variables p 1 , . . . , p k , we get that 
Using the inclusion-exclusion principle, we can rewrite Equation (18) as follows:
Letting R = S \ T in Equation (19), we get that
We can easily simplify Equation (20) to conclude that
Combining Equations (21) and (17) completes the proof.
Recall the discrete Hessian matrices from Definition 4.4. Building on Claim 5.4, we now express the Hessian matrix of G v k as a nonnegative weighted sum of discrete Hessian matrices of v. We note that when x ∈ P k , it is easy to verify that k−2 k · x ∈ P k−2 ; therefore, Equation (22) (15), and plug in expression Equation (16):
Differentiating with respect to x i and x j gives
We group the terms by projecting S onto [m] \ {i, j}; then, we simplify the resulting expression.
(−1)
(−1) Invoking Claim 5.4 with k = k − 2 and x = k−2 k · x, and plugging the resulting expression into Equation (23), we conclude that
Claims 4.5 and 5.5 establish that, when v is in CGS and k
is a nonnegative weighted sum of negative semidefinite matrices for each x ∈ P k . A nonnegative weighted sum of negative semidefinite matrices is negative semidefinite. Therefore, the Hessian matrix of G v k is negative semidefinite at each x ∈ P k , and we conclude that G v k is a concave function on P k . This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this article, we introduced the convex rounding mechanism design framework, and used it to design computationally tractable truthful-in-expectation approximation mechanisms for welfare maximization in CAs and CPPs. Our guarantees apply to bidders with valuations that are in the cone generated by GS valuations, are the best possible assuming that P = NP, and are the first such guarantees for natural NP-hard variants of these problems.
Since initial publication of the work in this article, the convex rounding framework has been applied to other problems in mechanism design in at least one instance [Hoefer and Kesselheim 2012] , and we anticipate more. In particular, an attractive potential application is to CAs with valuations exhibiting limited complementarity, as defined in Abraham et al. [2012] and Feige and Izsak [2013] . More generally, a characterization of the family of problems and linear-programming relaxations that admit optimal (or near optimal) convex rounding algorithms would open the door to understanding the power and limitations of our technique.
Other open questions and potential extensions of our results remain. Can our mechanisms be "derandomized," that is, converted to deterministic or at least universally truthful mechanisms attaining the same guarantees for CGS valuations? Can our lottery oracle models be relaxed to the traditional-value-oracle model, without sacrificing any of our guarantees? What about extensions to other natural classes of valuations, such as budgeted additive valuations? Finally, our result for CAs can be thought of as extending the tractability of truthful CAs from GS valuations to CGS valuations at the cost of a constant factor loss in the approximation ratio. More generally, noting that GS valuations have many attractive economic properties (e.g., permitting Walrasian equilibria in markets with discrete goods), do these properties admit approximate generalizations to CGS valuations? A more thorough understanding of the cone of GS valuations, and its economic and algorithmic implications, appears worthy of pursuit.
APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARIES
A.1. Matroids and Related Set Functions
In this section, we review some basics of matroid theory, and related CGS functions. For a more comprehensive reference on matroid theory, we refer the reader to Oxley [1992] . For their connection to gross substitutes, we refer the reader to the survey in Paes Leme [2013] .
A matroid M is a pair (X , I), where X is a finite ground set, and I is a nonempty family of subsets of X satisfying the following two properties. (1) Downward closure:
If S belongs to I, then so do all subsets of S. (2) The Exchange Property: Whenever T , S ∈ I with |T | < |S|, there is some x ∈ S \ T such that T ∪ {x} ∈ I. Elements of I are often referred to as the independent sets of the matroid. Subsets of X that are not in I are often called dependent.
We associate with matroid M a set function rank M : 2 X → N, known as the rank function of M, defined as follows: rank M (A) = max S∈I |S ∩ A|. Equivalently, the rank of set A in matroid M is the maximum size of an independent set contained in A. More generally, given a matroid M = (X , I) and a weight vector w ∈ R X , the associated weighted rank function is defined as follows: rank w M (A) = max S∈I i∈S∩A w i . A set function f on a ground set X is a matroid rank function if there exists a matroid M on the same ground set such that f = rank M , and is a matroid-weighted rank function if there exists M and w such that f = rank w M . It is known, and easy to check, that a matroid-weighted rank function can be expressed as a nonnegative weighted sum of (unweighted) matroid rank functions. Both weighted and unweighted matroid rank functions are monotone (
for all S and T ). In fact, they are in GS (see Paes Leme [2013] ).
Recall that a coverage function f on ground set [m] designates some set L of elements, and m subsets A 1 , . . . , A m ⊆ L, such that f (S) = | ∪ j∈S A j |. We note that coverage functions can be expressed as a sum of matroid rank functions. In particular, for each ∈ L, let f (S) = 1 if ∈ ∪ j∈S A j , and f (S) = 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that f is a matroid rank function, and
. As a consequence, coverage functions are in CGS.
A.2. Convex Optimization
In this section, we distill some basics of convex optimization. For more details, see Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [2001] . Definition A.1. A maximization problem is given by a set of instances (P, c), where P is a subset of some Euclidean space, c : P → R, and the goal is to maximize c(x) over x ∈ P. We say that is a convex maximization problem if, for every (P, c) ∈ , P is a compact convex set, and c : P → R is concave. If c : P → R + for every instance of , we say that is nonnegative. Definition A.2. We say that a nonnegative maximization problem is real-arithmetic solvable (henceforth R-solvable) in polynomial time if there is an algorithm that takes as input the representation of an instance I = (P, c) ∈ -in which we use |I| to denote the number of bits in the representation-and an approximation parameter , and in time poly(|I|, log(1/ )) outputs x ∈ P such that c(x) ≥ (1 − ) max y∈P c(y). Both of our mechanisms assumed the existence of a "lottery-value" oracle for evaluating a player's expected value on a distribution. As argued in Dughmi et al. [2011b] , these oracles cannot always be implemented efficiently-in fact, doing so is #P-hard for some matroid rank functions. Nevertheless, we justify employing these oracles on two grounds: First, our lottery-value oracles are easily implemented for the most interesting example of CGS valuations, specifically explicit coverage functions. Second, our lottery-value oracles can be approximated arbitrarily well with high probability using a polynomial number of value oracle queries (see ). Even though we are not able to reconcile the incurred sampling errors-small as they may be-with the requirement that our mechanisms be exactly truthful, it was shown in Dughmi et al. [2011b] that relaxing our solution concept to approximate truthfulness -also known as -truthfulness -removes this difficulty for CAs, allowing us to relax our oracle model to the more traditional value oracles. Next, we show that our oracles can be implemented efficiently for explicit coverage functions.
Coverage Valuations. An explicit coverage valuation v is represented as follows. There is a finite set L, and a family
) is encoded explicitly as a bipartite graph. Next, we show that both our lottery oracles can be implemented in time polynomial in the size of the representation of such a valuation, implying that the mechanisms of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 can be implemented in polynomial time when players have explicit coverage valuations. . Let S be a random set that includes each j ∈ [m] independently with probability x j . The outcome of the product-lottery-value oracle of v evaluated at x is equal to the sum, over all ∈ L, of the probability that is "covered" by S -specifically, ∈L Pr[ ∈ ∪ j∈S A j ]. It is easy to verify that a term of this sum can be expressed as the following closed-form expression.
It is simple to check that this expression can be evaluated in time polynomial in the representation of the set system. This completes the proof. 
: ∈ A j } be the set of projects that "cover" . The output of the bounded-lottery-value oracle with marginals x 1 , . . . , x k can be written as follows:
It is simple to check that this expression can be evaluated in time polynomial in the representation of the set system. This completes the proof.
B.2. Computing Payments
In this section, we show how to efficiently compute truth-telling payments for our mechanisms. In fact, we show that this is possible for any maximal in distributional range allocation rule for CAs or CPPs, given as a black box. We note that Proposition B.3 holds for any mechanism design problem in which players have nonnegative valuations, and in which the zero valuation (i.e., the valuation assigning 0 to each outcome) is a feasible report for each player. Both properties hold for CAs and CPPs. We leave open the question of whether it is possible to enforce individual rationality and nonnegative payments for our mechanism ex-post rather than in expectation.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION B.3. Let p vcg denote the (deterministic) VCG payment scheme for the problem of expected welfare maximization over R. We can write p vcg as follows.
Combining A with p vcg yields a mechanism that is in expectation truthful, individually rational, and has nonnegative payments. However, payment scheme p vcg may not be implementable efficiently, due to the difficulty in exactly evaluating the expectations in expression (24). Nevertheless, it is an easy observation that any payment scheme p with E[ p i (v)] = p vcg i (v) for each i and v yields the same guarantees in expectation. To complete the proof, we show how to compute such a payment rule p using only a polynomial number of invocations of A as a black box. We sample random variable p i (v) as follows: Let T be a sample from lottery A(v), let T −i be a sample from lottery A(v −i , 0), and let
. Using Equation (24) 
B.3. Beyond CGS Valuations
In this section, we discuss the prospect of extending our results beyond CGS valuations. First, we argue that our restriction to a subset of submodular functions is not merely an artifact of our analysis. Specifically, we exhibit a submodular function that is not in the CGS family; moreover, both the Poisson and k-bounded-lottery rounding schemes can be nonconvex when a player has this function as the valuation. Then, we briefly argue that our mechanism may yet apply to some valuations that are not in CGSs.
Finally, we discuss recent results that rule out extending our results to all submodular functions.
We define a budget additive (therefore submodular) function v on four items {1, 2, 3, 4}. Three of the items are "small," one item is "big," and the budget equals the value of the big item.
We can show that v is not a CGS function by invoking Claim 4.5. Specifically, one can manually check that the discrete Hessian matrix H v ∅ of v at ∅ (see Definition 4.4) is not negative semidefinite. Moreover, for a player with valuation v, Poisson rounding renders the player's expected value function G v (x) (Equation (11)) nonconcave in x: by Equation (12), the Hessian matrix of G v (x) approaches the discrete Hessian H v ∅ as x tends to zero. Since H v ∅ is not negative semidefinite, G v (x) is nonconcave for x near zero. We note that we can construct a large family of similar counterexamples by simply increasing the number of "small items" in v. Similar difficulties hold for the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme.
We observe that our mechanisms may yet apply to some valuations that are not in CGSs. Our results used only two properties of CGS functions: their discrete Hessian matrices are negative semidefinite (Claim 4.5, which is used to prove Lemmas 4.2 and 5.2), and they are submodular (used to prove Lemmas 4.3 and 5.3). Therefore, our results extend directly to the class of all set functions satisfying both of these properties. We leave open the question of whether there exist interesting functions in this class that are not in CGSs. More generally, understanding the class of set functions with negative semidefinite discrete Hessian matrices-in particular, the relationship of this class to other classes of set functions studied in the literature-may be an interesting direction for future inquiry.
Finally, as noted in the introduction, recent impossibility results [Dughmi and Vondrák 2011; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012] have ruled out polynomial-time and constant-approximate truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for CAs and CPPs with general submodular valuations. The proofs in Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] , and Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] exploit double-peaked submodular valuations, which are evidently not in CGSs and do not admit negative semidefinite discrete Hessians. It is worth noting that each of these papers considers a somewhat different computational model from ours: Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] considers the value oracle model, and Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] considers a succinctly described class of submodular valuations, for which it is unclear whether our lottery oracles can be evaluated efficiently. Nevertheless, both impossibility results rule out approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms as well; combined with the fact (discussed in Section B.1) that our results can be ported to the value-oracle model at the cost of relaxing to approximate truthfulness in expectation, the results in Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] and Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] rule out extending our techniques to general submodular valuations.
C. SOLVING THE CONVEX PROGRAMS
In this section, we overcome some technical difficulties related to the solvability of convex programs for both CAs and CPPs. Since both CAs and CPPs are similar in this respect, we first present these ideas in the context of CAs, and later discuss the necessary modifications for CPPs.
C.1. Combinatorial Auctions
We show in Section C.1.1 that, in the product-lottery-value oracle model, the four conditions for "solvability" of convex programs, as stated in Fact A.3, are easily satisfied for convex program Equation (8). However, an additional challenge remains: "solving" a convex program -as in Definition A.2 -returns an approximately optimal solution. The optimal solution of a convex program may be irrational in general; thus, this is unavoidable.
We show how to overcome this difficulty if we settle for polynomial runtime in expectation. While the optimal solution x * of Equation (8) cannot be computed explicitly, the random variable r poiss (x * ) can be sampled in expected polynomial time. The key idea is the following: sampling the random variable r poiss (x * ) rarely requires precise knowledge of x * . Depending on the coin flips of r poiss , we decide how accurately we need to solve convex program (8) in order compute r poiss (x * ). Roughly speaking, we show that the probability of requiring a (1 − )-approximation falls exponentially in 1 . As a result, we can sample r poiss (x * ) in expected polynomial time. We implement this plan in Section C.1.2 under the simplifying assumption that convex program Equation (8) is well conditioned -that is, "sufficiently concave" everywhere. In Section C.1.3, we show how to remove that assumption by slightly modifying our algorithm. It suffices to show that the four conditions of Fact A.3 are satisfied in our setting. The first three are immediate from elementary combinatorial optimization (see, e.g., Schrijver [2003] ). It remains to show that the first-order oracle, as defined in Fact A.3, can be implemented in polynomial time in the product-lottery-value oracle model. The objective f (x) of convex program Equation (8) can, by definition, be written as
where v i is the valuation function of player i, x i is the vector (x i1 , . . . , x im ), and G v i is as defined in Equation (11). By definition, G v i (x i ) is the outcome of querying the productlottery-value oracle of player i with (1 − e −x i1 , . . . , 1 − e −x im ) . Therefore, we can evaluate f (x) using n product-lottery-value query, one for each player.
It remains to show that we can also evaluate the (multivariate) derivative f (x) of f (x). We fix i and j, and use Equation (11) to take the partial derivative of f with respect to x ij :
where the second equality follows from the elementary rules of differentiation, and the third equality follows by grouping the sets S ⊆ [m] by their projection T onto [m] \ { j}. Next, we relate Equation (25) to product-lottery-value oracle queries. Consider querying the oracle for v i with y + = (1 − e −x i1 , . . . , 1 − e −x im ) ∨ 1 j , where ∨ denotes entrywise maximum and 1 j denotes the vector with all entries equal to 0 except for a 1 at position j. The outcome given by Equation (4) can be simplified as follows:
where the second equality follows from the fact that y + j = 1 and the consequence that ∈S y + ∈S (1 − y + ) = 0 for every set S excluding j, and the third equality follows from the variable substitution T = S \ { j}.
Similarly, consider querying the oracle for v i with y − = (1 − e −x i1 , . . . , 1 − e −x im ) ∧ 0 j , where ∧ denotes entrywise minimum and 0 j denotes the vector with all entries equal to 1 except for a 0 at position j. The outcome given by Equation (4) can be simplified as follows:
where the second equality follows from the fact that y Combining Equations (25), (26), and (27), we conclude that
therefore, this entry of the gradient of f can be evaluated using two product-lotteryvalue queries. Consquently, f (x) can be evaluated using 2nm product-lottery-value queries, 2 for each player-item pair. This completes the proof of Claim C.1.
C.1.2. The Well-Conditioned Case. In this section, we make the following simplifying assumptions on convex program Equation (8): We are given C ≥ 0 and λ ≥ C exp(poly(n,m)) such that C upper bounds the optimal value f (x * ), and f is strongly concave with parameter λ everywhere in the feasible set.
12 Under these assumptions, we prove Lemma C.2. LEMMA C.2. Assume that we are given C ≥ 0 and λ ≥ C exp(poly(n,m)) such that C ≥ f (x * ) and f is strongly concave with parameter λ. Algorithm 1, instantiated for CAs with r = r poiss , can be simulated in expected time polynomial in n and m. follows:
Assume that x is a (1 − )-approximate solution to Equation (8). Equation (28) implies that
Therefore, ||x − x * || 2 ≤ δ, implying that x is a δ-estimate. This completes the proof of Lemma C.2.
C.1.3. Guaranteeing Good Conditioning. In this section, we propose a modification r + poiss of the Poisson rounding scheme r poiss . We will argue that r + poiss satisfies all the properties of r poiss established so far, with one exception: the approximation guarantee of Lemma 4.3 is reduced to 1 − 1 e − 2 −mn . Then, we will show that r + poiss satisfies the strong concavity assumption of Lemma C.2, demonstrating that said assumption may be removed. Therefore, Algorithm 1, instantiated with r = r + poiss for CAs with CGS valuations in the product-lottery-value oracle model, is a (1 − 1/e − 2 −mn ) approximate and can be implemented in expected poly(n, m) time. Finally, we show in Remark C.4 how to recover the 2 −mn term to get a clean 1 − 1/e approximation ratio, as claimed in Theorem 4.1. We define r + poiss in Algorithm 4. Intuitively, r + poiss allocates as in r poiss with probability 1 − μ. Otherwise, with probability β(x), it allocates all items to a player chosen at random. β is chosen to be a concave function of x, and can be thought of as adding "concave noise" to r poiss . 
It is clear that the expected welfare when using r = r mn 2 2 mn . Clearly, C is an upper bound on the optimal welfare. Moreover, since the first term in Equation (29) is concave and the function i, j (1 − x 2 ij ) is strongly concave with parameter 2, the quantity E[w(r + poiss (x))] is a strongly concave function of x with parameter 2λ.
Remark C.4. In this section, we sacrificed 2 −mn in the approximation ratio in order to guarantee expected polynomial runtime of our algorithm even when convex program Equation (8) is not well conditioned. This loss can be recovered to get a clean 1 − 1/e approximation as follows. Given our (1 − 1/e − 2 −mn )-approximate MIDR algorithm A, construct the following algorithm A : Given an instance of CAs, A runs A on the instance with probability 1 − e2 −mn , and with the remaining probability solves the instance optimally by brute force enumeration in time 2 mn poly(m, n). It was shown in Dughmi and Roughgarden [2010] that a random composition of MIDR mechanisms is MIDR; therefore, A is MIDR. The expected runtime of A is bounded by the expected runtime of A plus e2 −mn · 2 mn poly(m, n) = O(poly(n, m)). Finally, the expected approximation of A is the weighted average of the approximation ratio of A and the optimal approximation ratio 1, and is at least (1 − e2 −mn ) · (1 − 1/e − 2 −mn ) + e2 −mn · 1 ≥ 1 − 1/e.
C.2. Combinatorial Public Projects
We now adapt the techniques of Section C.1 to CPPs.
C.2.1. Approximating the Convex Program.
CLAIM C.5. There is an algorithm for CPPs with CGS valuations in the boundedlottery-value oracle model that takes as input an instance of the problem and an approximation parameter > 0, runs in poly(n, m, log(1/ )) time, and returns a (1 − )-approximate solution to convex program Equation (14).
As in CAs, the first three conditions of Fact A.3 follow from elementary combinatorial optimization. It remains to show that a first-order oracle, as defined in Fact A.3, can be implemented in polynomial time in the bounded-lottery-value oracle model. We let f (x) denote the objective function of convex program Equation (6) when r = r k . This objective can, by definition, be written as follows:
where v i is the valuation function of player i and G , where D k (x/k) is the k-bounded lottery with marginals x/k, as defined in Section 2.6. Therefore, we can evaluate f (x) using n bounded-lottery-value queries, one for each player. It remains to show that we can also evaluate the (multivariate) derivative f (x) of f (x). Using definition Equation (15) and Claim 5.4, we take the partial derivative of G v i k with respect to x j and simplify the Finally, the proof that the estimation oracle x(δ) can be implemented in poly(n, m, log(1/δ)) time is identical to that in Section C.1.2. This completes the proof of Lemma C.6. C.2.3. Guaranteeing Good Conditioning. Analogous to Section C.1.3, we present a modification r + k of the k-bounded-lottery rounding that adds "concave noise" to r k . This is given in Algorithm 5. by an essentially identical argument to that in Remark C.4.
